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 Why Praying “Hail, Mary” Does Not Denote 
to Invade Iraq and to Accept Capitalism?  
Contemporary Catholicism and Its Relation  
to Neoconservative Ideology* 
 
MARIÁN SEKERÁK 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Christianity, and especially its Catholic form, has been 
considering a more-less conservative concept. At least since the 
publication of Blessed Paul VIʼs encyclical letter Humanae vitae (1968) 
re-affirming the orthodox catholic teaching regarding married love, 
parenthood, and the rejection of all forms of contraception during the 
years of Western sexual revolution, Catholic Church has being viewed as 
relatively robust against her own modifications and opposing or at least 
slowly reflecting those societal changes which are deemed to be 
progressive and salutary. Despite the fact that this argument cannot be 
hold longer as entirely true, as I will show later, more and more intensive 
debate between those who defend “traditional values” and the so-called 
“modernists” has come on the scene in recent years. This is evident not 
only at European but also global level. It is not rare to see this debate, 
sometimes apparently too intense and sharp, to be relocated to the field 
of dogmatism and “right and proper” explication of religious truths. 
Mainly in the Euro-Atlantic sphere the debate is being slightly transposed 
to the political realm as a discussion of the significance and role which 
Christianity plays in building of the moral foundations of society1. This is 
typical particularly for Catholic neoconservatives who usually try to 
                                                          
*  This paper came to being within the Development of Scientific Areas Programme at the 
Charles University in Prague (PRVOUK), P 17 Sciences of Society, Politics, and Media 
under the Challenge of the Times (Vědy o společnosti, politice a médiích ve výzvách 
doby), carried out at the Institute of Political Science of the Faculty of Social Sciences, 
Charles University in Prague. 
1  See Thomas E. Woods, How the Catholic Church Built Western Civilization, Regnery 
Publishing Inc, Washington, DC, 2005. 
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identify their socio-economic and political visions with religious belief, 
although it is an undeniable fact that the political ideology and 
Christianity as a religion are in essence different categories, as I shall try 
to demonstrate in this paper. Thus, they directly or indirectly suggest that 
only neoconservative political ideology can offer proper explication of 
religion in the sense of a universal religion which Christianity aspires to 
be. They often do so by using a language and expressions which recall 
“the priestly rhetoric”2, and utilizing religious terms and 
(pseudo)religious reasoning, such as moralizing, appeals to tradition and 
traditional values of society. In the case of Catholic neoconservatives this 
has been done by highlighting selected aspects of the Catholic Social 
Teaching as a bunch of various Papal and Vatican documents on social 
issues on the one hand, and concealing the critique of capitalism which is 
inherently contained in the Teaching on the other. This has been done in spite of 
the fact that the Catholic Social Teaching cannot be considered as an 
independent economic or political theory of the Catholic Church. Nor does it 
constitute an autonomous socio-political doctrine of the Church or its political 
programme. That is why it should be helpful to focus on those aspects of 
Catholic Social Teaching which are not often accentuated and show their 
occasional abuse of neoconservative “priestly rhetoric”. 
Whilst the former (neoconservative) camp is being identified with 
“orthodox” and “the most faithful” Christians, the later one, “modernists”, are 
labelled by their opponents by various titles, for example as liberals, Marxists, 
pejoratively even as leftists. This ideological struggle has even gone so far that 
the author of a blog in the prestigious daily The Economist stated that Pope 
Francis “consciously or unconsciously follows Vladimir Lenin in his diagnosis 
of capitalism and imperialism”3. In the same vein, an influential American 
conservative political commentator Rush H. Limbaugh condemned Pope 
Francis’ views on economy and labelled them as Marxist and socialist4. I 
consider both the mentioned simple distinction and criticism not only 
unsustainable but also false. 
                                                          
2
  Kenneth S. Zagacki, “The Priestly Rhetoric of Neoconservatism”, Western Journal of 
Communication, vol. 60, no. 2, 1996, pp. 168-187. 
3  See Erasmus: Religion and Public Policy, “Francis, Capitalism, and War: The Pope’s 
Divisions”, (20 June 2014) http://www.economist.com/ blogs/erasmus/2014/06/francis-
capitalism-and-war. 
4
  See Rush H. Limbaugh, “It’s Sad How Wrong Pope Francis is (Unless it’s a deliberate 
mistranslation by leftists)”, (27 November 2013), http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/ 
daily/2013/11/27/it_s_sad_how_wrong_pope_francis_is_unless_it_s_a_deliberate_mistra
nslation_by_leftists; Idem, “Pope Francis Talking Redistribution Again”, (9 May 2014), 
http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2014/05/09/ 
pope_francis_is_talking_redistribution_again. 
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In the following sections I aim to (1) describe the main characteristic 
features of neoconservatism qua political ideology with a specific 
understanding of economy and politics; (2) sketch out Catholic Church’s views 
on economy which seem to be contradictory and inconsistent over time as well 
as incompatible with those which have been promoting by neoconservatives; (3) 
try to reject reception of the Catholic religion and/or the Catholic Social 
Teaching as a political ideology; (4) compare U.S. foreign policy doctrines 
under George W. Bush’s presidency to views of Holy See and traditional 
Catholic moral teaching. Finally, I present an overview of some turns of the 
Catholic doctrine related to freedom of conscience and religion, ideal 
government and Church’s internal system and competencies of her own 
members. By using of these examples I shall try to point out that the Catholic 
belief is not identical with neoconservatives’ worldview and that Catholics 
could neither in their faith nor in their political action be bound by the opinions 
of their neoconservative co-believers. What is more, I would like to emphasize 
that the Catholic Church should not be regarded as outdated and conservative 
institution which is incapable to adapt to new circumstances and changing 
global trends. 
 
 
What Is the Point of Neoconservatism? 
 
To begin with, the word “conservatism” as a kernel of the term 
“neoconservatism” is used in various fashions. Furthermore, the word has 
acquired more-less negative meaning over time and people use it to describe a 
type of affection for the old, maintaining backward habits, opinions, theories, 
morals, etc. In general, it is deemed as a mental rigidity and hostility towards 
everything new5. To be sure, it is not my enterprise here to offer thorough 
etymological analysis of the word or depict its different shades of meaning. I 
would like, however, to use these vocabulary-based considerations in order to 
throw some light on its quite different meaning used by current 
neoconservatives. They do not deem “conservative values” as outdated, 
obsolete or inherently unprogressive. For them, an enduring theme of thought 
and life “is the perception of society as a moral community, held together by 
                                                          
5
  Karolina Adamová et al., Politologický slovník, C.H. Beck, Prague, 2001, pp. 105-106. 
See also Pavel Kolář, “Geneze novodobého konzervatismu jako problém sociálních věd 
ve 20. století”, Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, vol. 35, no. 4, 1999, 
pp. 375-395; Robert Nisbet, Konzervatismus, Občanský institut, Prague 1993; Jean-
François Drolet, American Neoconservatism: The Politics and Culture of a Reactionary 
Idealism, Columbia University Press, New York, 2011; Peter Steinfels, The 
Neoconservatives: The Origins of a Movement – with a New Foreword From Dissent to 
Political Power, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2013. 
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shared values and beliefs, and functioning as an organic whole”6. From a 
theoretical point of view they are grounded on the so-called “organic theory of 
the state” which was, paradoxically, a feature of a number of totalitarian 
regimes. This theory holds that the state is not a mere aggregation of individuals 
but should be viewed as living organism made up of individuals related to one 
another, as well as human body consists of its parts and individual cells. Human 
beings exist within the state and the state cannot survive without its parts, i.e. 
individuals. Both the state and its members, citizens, constitute together an 
organic unity where a family is the basic cell allowing reproduction of state’s 
human substrate. In exchange for individuals’ expressions of legitimacy and 
support, the state provides them a background for peaceful life in according 
with their own ways of life and life-giving reproduction. The problem arises 
when peaceful life and necessary material conditions start to be absent. This 
happens when unsatisfied emotional needs or economic problems, such as 
income inequality and closely-related social exclusion reach a critical limit. In a 
belief that they can avoid these difficulties, neoconservatives propose two 
distinct and contradictory solutions: social and political conservatism 
intertwined with economic liberalism or Mont Pelerin style libertarianism 
which is sometimes called “conservative fusion” or “fusionism”, a term first 
coined by Frank Meyer in his book The Conservative Mainstream (Arlington 
House, New Rochelle, NY, 1969)7. 
As social and political conservatives, neoconservatives should not be 
identified with the so-called “Ultramontanists”, i.e. French traditionalists and 
theoreticians of counter-revolution from the 18th and 19th century represented, 
for instance, by Joseph-Marie de Maistre, Louis Gabriel Ambroise de Bonald, 
Hugues-Félicité Robert de Lamennais, François René de Chateaubriand, Pierre-
Simon Ballanche, François Dominique de Reynaud, Louis de Halier, or Honoré 
de Balzac. All of them could be described as “fideistic conservatives”, as John 
Kekes calls them8. They consciously rejected “reason as a guide to the political 
arrangements that a good society ought to have”9. For them, only the Christian 
                                                          
6
  Andrew Heywood, Political Theory: An Introduction. 3rd ed., Palgrave Macmillan, 
Houndmills, 2004, p. 138. 
7
  This is evident despite the fact that some neoconservatives try ardently to refuse such 
bonds; see, for example, Adam Wolfson, “Conservatives and Neoconservatives”, in Irwin 
STELZER (ed.) Neoconservatism, Atlantic Books, London, 2004, pp. 215-231. On 
fusionism see more in Emanuel-Mihail Socaciu, Radu-Bogdan Uszkai, “Fusionsim, 
Religion, and the Tea Party”, Journal for the Study of Religion and Ideologies, vol. 11, 
no. 33, 2012, pp. 89-106; Peter Kolozi, “The Neoconservative Critiques of and 
Reconciliation with Capitalism”, New Political Science, vol. 35, no. 1, 2013, pp. 44-64. 
8  John Kekes, A Case for Conservatism, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, London, 1998, p. 30; 
Idem, “Conservative Theories”, in Gerald F. Gaus, Chandran Kukathas (eds.) Handbook 
of Political Theory, Thousand Oaks, London, Sage, New Delhi, 2004, p. 132. 
9   John Kekes, A Case for Conservatism, cit., p. 30. 
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belief was guidance for both private and political life. In their theoretical works 
they fiercely supported monarchical or aristocratic government as the ideal 
political regime based on religious doctrines10. Sovereignty, they claimed, did 
not belong to the people but only to God. Especially de Maistre in his book Du 
Pape (“On the Pope”) asserted an authoritarian conception of politics built upon 
the strong theocratic political system in which the Pope was considered a major 
driving force of education. Catholic Church was seen as the most perfect 
institution, combining in itself infallibility in spiritual matters and sovereignty 
in earthly matters. Societal changes were considered unnecessary and 
undesirable forces that should be eliminated forever. He held that individual’s 
call for freedom was pure egoism; it was a revolt of a part against the whole 
body of the people. De Maistre rejected both constitutionalism as well as 
parliamentary form of government and resisted any changes and revolutions, 
attacking the individualism and human freedom. According to him, the best 
government should be concentrated in a person of absolute and authoritarian 
ruler11. Despite of supporting monarchy and papal authority, Ultramontanism 
had become neither popular, nor appraised by the Catholic Church. It is, then, 
not surprising that Gregory XVI in his encyclical letter Singulari nos of 1834 
strongly condemned the errors of Félicité de Lammenais, one of the adherents 
of Ultramontanism. 
Indeed, neoconservatives cannot be identified with French 
traditionalists. Nevertheless, their support for “traditional (Western) values” 
(marriages between a man and a woman, role of the religion in society, 
morality, etc.) and deprecation of liberalism, the so-called moral relativism, and 
cultural heterogeneity is obvious12. As Wendy Brown ironically states, 
neoconservatives of various shades are bound together “primarily by shared 
objects of loathing: the United Nations, Amnesty International, and the World 
Court; latte liberals, redistributive welfarists, godless libertines, and flag 
burners; Muslims, European cosmopolitanism, critical intellectuals, Jane Fonda, 
                                                          
10
  See Richard F. Costigan, “Tradition and the Beginning of the Ultramontane Movement”, 
Irish Theological Quarterly, vol. 48, no. 1-2, 1981, pp. 27-46; Ulrich Wollner, “Vybrané 
aspekty myslenia hlavných predstaviteľov francúzskeho tradicionalizmu 19. storočia”, 
Filozofia, vol. 57, no. 4, 2002, pp. 259-274; Idem, “Francúzski tradicionalisti”, in 
František Novosád, Dagmar Smreková (eds.) Dejiny sociálneho a politického myslenia, 
Kalligram, Bratislava, 2013, pp. 328-339; Adam Wielomski, “Ultramontanizm wczoraj i 
dziś”, Teologia Polityczna, vol. 2004/2005, no. 2, 2004/2005, pp. 303-311. 
11
  See Joseph de Maistre, The Pope; Considered in his Relation with the Church, Temporal 
Sovereignties, Separated Churches, and the Cause of Civilization, C. Dolman, London, 
1850. 
12
  David Robertson, The Routledge Dictionary of Politics. 3rd ed., Routledge, London, New 
York, 2004, pp. 339-340. More about differences between “traditional kinds of 
conservatism” and neoconservatism see, e.g., Tibor Mándi, “Ideology and Tradition. An 
Epistemological View of Neoconservatism”, World Political Science Review, vol. 10, no. 1, 
2014, pp. 147-162; Kenneth S. Zagacki, “The Priestly Rhetoric…cit.”, pp. 180-182. 
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San Francisco, and ethics committees...”13. In accordance with some past 
conservatives, such as Edmund Burke, they deem tradition as “a set of 
customary beliefs, practices, and actions that has endured from the past to the 
present and attracted the allegiance of people so that they wish to perpetuate 
it”14. This is manifested in continental Europe not only by opposing same-sex 
marriages but in some extreme cases also by calling for a restoration of the 
“unity of throne and altar”, i.e. resurrection of the royalist ideas as well as 
rejection of both democracy and republicanism, for example in France, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and in some other previously monarchic states. 
Moderate neoconservatives by arguing for a restoration of authority and social 
discipline, however, plead for an elitist or a limited model of democracy with 
the smallest possible governmental interventions in economy on the one hand 
and the broadest possible market freedom on the other15. They accept 
governmental interference and some changes in political arrangements with 
protecting traditional values while a government should “keep these changes as 
small and specific as possible”16. Neoconservatives are hostile to utopias and 
any attempts to promote broad visions of equality, particularly those which 
could be labelled as socialist or social-democratic. They never question profits, 
accumulation, or wealth inequality. Nor do they conceive capitalism as 
inherently exploitative economic system17. They believe that capitalism is “the 
only economic system consistent with human freedom and with economic 
growth”18, and hail its “bourgeois” virtues and values as “hard work, thrift, 
frugality, moderation, and self-discipline”19. Therefore, as put by Andrew 
Heywood, neoconservative political thought “has always been open to the 
charge that it amounts to ruling-class ideology. In proclaiming the need to resist 
change, it legitimizes the status quo and defends the interests of dominant or 
elite groups”20. Using Wendy Brown’s sharp words, neoconservatism “is born 
out of a literally unholy alliance, one that is only unevenly and opportunistically 
religious”21. 
                                                          
13
  Wendy Brown, “American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-
Democratisation”, Political Theory, vol. 34, no. 6, 2006, p. 697. 
14
  John Kekes, A Case for Conservatism, cit., p. 38. 
15
  Cf. Daniela Ježovicová, “Konzervatizmus v dejinách politického myslenia”, Politické 
vedy, vol. 1, no. 4, 1998, p. 104. 
16
  John Kekes, A Case for Conservatism, cit., p. 47. 
17
  Peter Kolozi, “The Neoconservative Critiques…cit.”, p. 45. 
18
  David J. Hoeveler, Jr., “Conservative Intellectuals and the Reagan Ascendancy”, The 
History Teacher, vol. 23, no. 3, 1990, p. 313. 
19  Ibidem. 
20
  Andrew Heywood, Political Theory…cit., pp. 138-139. 
21
  Wendy Brown, “American Nightmare…cit.”, p. 696. It is surely no coincidence that one 
of the representatives of this stream was Otto von Habsburg, a descendant of the noblest 
European family and a member of the libertarian Mont Pelerin Society. 
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Despite of a vast number of common traits we should distinguish some 
independent wings of conservatism: French Nouvelle Droite and American 
Paleoconservatism. French New Right as a cultural movement represented 
mainly by philosopher Alain de Benoist can be hardly positioned in the 
traditional political dichotomy (Left-Right). U.S. paleoconservatives create 
ideologically more-less coherent political group gathered around the intellectual 
periodicals, such as Modern age (founded in 1957 by the American Catholic 
intellectual Russel Kirk), Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture 
(founded in 1976), and The American Conservative (founded in 2002). They 
share some fundamental characteristic with neoconservatives, such as 
glorification of capitalism qua economic system, accentuating traditional 
values, rejecting the emphasis on individual rights and democracy, or promoting 
the elite theory of government. On the contrary, they differ from 
neoconservatives in some points. First and foremost, paleoconservatives attack 
capitalism from the cultural point of view. They unanimously agree with 
neoliberal theoreticians, such as Friedrich A. Hayek or Milton Friedman that 
capitalism denotes the basis of individual freedom, political liberty, and 
individual self-realization. But they believe that “by privileging individual 
liberty over the formation of character, that is, bourgeois virtues, libertarian 
thinkers failed to appreciate the cultural bulwarks of capitalism”22. According to 
them, neoconservatives promote capitalist amorality, cultural nihilism and 
devalue classical “protestant” ethics of capitalism by undermining the moral 
character of the citizenship and threatening “the social, cultural, and political 
institutions of Western civilization itself”23. In their worldview, “the acids of 
modernity have left us entirely disinherited from old customs and ways, and 
conservatism’s project of conservation is but a glittering illusion”24. 
Paleoconservatism should also be distinguished from American 
“religious right” represented by neoconservatives25. However “there are some 
points of association, and paleoconservatives see Christianity as a critical 
component of American ethnicity, their thinking is derived [...] from secular 
rather than Biblical premises”26. Religion, they believe, has “an indispensable 
role to play in fostering public discipline, preserving social stability, and acting 
as a vehicle of moral tradition”27. True religion, furthermore, has stoical impact. 
It is “a consolation to the soul despairing of the world’s injustices and the 
corrective to the impossible schemes that project a cure to those injustices into 
                                                          
22  Peter Kolozi, “The Neoconservative Critiques…cit.”, p. 51. 
23
  Ibidem, p. 52. 
24
  Adam Wolfson, “Conservatives…cit.”, p. 219. 
25
  See Paulina Napierała, “The Strategy of the Religious Right: Christian Fiction or Political 
Agitation?”, Ad Americam: Journal of American Studies, vol. 2012, no. 13, 2012, pp. 45-65. 
26
  Edward Ashbee, “Politics of Paleoconservatism”, Society, vol. 37, no. 3, 2000, p. 80. 
27
  David J. Hoeveler, Jr., “Conservative Intellectuals…cit.”, p. 314. 
MARIÁN SEKERÁK 
 
 
Romanian Political Science Review ? vol. XV ? no. 1 ? 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68
the reforming zeal to transform the world”28. Moreover, paleoconservatives 
differ from neoconservatives in their foreign policy attitudes and the assessment 
of cultural-political message of the American Revolution and American 
political institutions29. As the main representatives of the Catholic 
paleosonservative wing in the U.S.A. are deemed Brent Bozell, Robert A. 
Sirico, Michael Novak, Warren H. Carroll, Patrick Joseph Buchanan, Richard 
John Neuhaus, William McGurn, George Weigel, as well as the aforementioned 
Russel Kirk30. We should also mention the fellows of the neoconservative 
Acton Institute or the libertarian Cato Institute and Competitive Enterprise 
Institute. The supporters of traditional Catholicism who could be more-less 
deemed as paleoconservatives in continental Europe are, for instance, Italian 
politician Rocco Buttiglione and recently deceased lawyer Mario Palmaro (who 
verbally criticized Pope Francis several times), Czech political scientist and 
politician Petr Fiala, or French economist Jean-Yves Naudet. The youngest 
generation of Catholic paleoconservatives is represented by Thomas E. Woods, 
Jr., an American historian, writer and political analyst. Almost all of the 
aforementioned intellectuals can be viewed as the proponents of fusionism. 
Especially in the works of M. Novak31 or T. E. Woods, Jr.32 we can find typical 
features of both political Catholicism and economic libertarianism/neoliberalism. 
They are both strongly influenced by the Austrian school of economics. It 
seems, then, that “[m]uch of what is wrong about libertarianism from the 
Catholic perspective has been integrated into purportedly Catholic ethical 
reflection on the economy”33. 
To conclude this section, it will be appropriate to deal with one more 
political movement which must be distinguished from neoconservatism, 
although it may resemble it in relying on Christianity as one of its main 
inspirations. It is the Christian Democracy, whose origins date back to the 19th 
century. The largest expansion of the Christian Democratic political parties 
                                                          
28
  Ibidem. It is without any doubts that their views on the role of religion in society are quite 
different from those of classical conservatives such as Michael Oakeshott. See Michael 
Oakeshott, Religion, Politics and the Moral Life; Timothy Fuller, ed., Yale University 
Press, New Haven and London, 1993. 
29
  See Roman Míčka, “Dějinný kontext a současné podoby amerického politického 
katolicismu”, Studia theologica, vol. 15, no. 3, 2013, pp. 91-98. 
30
  More about his philosophy see, for example Gerald J. Russello, “Russell Kirk and 
Territorial Democracy”, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 34, no. 4, 2004, 
pp. 109-124. 
31
  See Michael Novak, The Catholic Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, The Free Press, New 
York, 1993. 
32
  See Thomas E. Woods, The Church and the Market: A Catholic Defense of the Free 
Economy, Regnery Publishing Inc, Washington, DC, 2005. 
33
  Daniel K. Finn, “Nine Libertarian Heresies Tempting Neoconservative Catholics to 
Stray from Catholic Social Thought”, Journal of Markets & Morality, vol. 14, no. 2, 
2011, p. 488. 
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occurred in the interwar period and after World War 2, especially in the former 
Italy, Germany and the Fourth French Republic. At that time, this type of 
political parties resigned on a purely confessional orientation and altered their 
previous stance on the economy. Nowadays, such parties usually tend to be 
placed in the centre-right of the political spectrum, and are characterized by 
moderate conservatism and social liberalism, mainly in Western Europe. 
Contrary to the neoconservatives, Christian Democrats usually support the 
principle of social partnership, the welfare state and a mixed type of economy. 
Although they draw from religious belief as a source of understanding a man 
and his political dimension, this type of parties should not be viewed as clerical. 
Their connectivity to the Church structures is predominantly low. They pay 
lower attention to the societal elites and present themselves mainly as folk-type 
political parties. In spite of continuing popularity of neoconservative parties 
(not only in the U.S.A.), the era of the greatest success of Christian Democratic 
parties in Europe culminated between the 1970s and 1990s34. 
 
 
Catholic Social Teaching: An Illusion of Economic 
Neoliberalism 
 
It is undisputable that the Catholic doctrine resembles conservatism in 
many ways. By refusing contraception, same-sex marriages and upholding of 
the priests’ celibacy the Church “still insists on the crucial function of the value 
framework which has an interesting parallel with conservatism”35. One of the 
evident examples is St. John Paul IIʼs encyclical Centesimus annus (1991). 
Reading § 49 of the document where the Polish Pope writes on the 
strengthening of intergenerational bounds, we can find some parallels with 
Edmund Burke’s locus classicus from his Reflections on the Revolution in 
France, that society is indeed a partnership not only between those who are 
living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are 
to be born. Amongst the other papal statements resembling conservative 
                                                          
34
  See more in David Robertson, The Routledge Dictionary of Politics, cit., 2004, pp. 62-63; 
Roberto Papini, “Christianity and Democracy in Europe: The Christian Democratic 
Movement”, in John Witte, Jr. (ed.) Christianity and Democracy in Global Context, 
Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1993, pp. 47-64; Thomas Albert Kselman, Joseph A. 
Buttigieg, European Christian Democracy: Historical Legacies and Comparative 
Perspectives, Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, IN, 2003; John Bruton, “The Influence of 
the Economic Crisis on Centre-Right Values: A Christian Democratic Perspective”, 
European View, vol. 11, no. 2, 2012, p. 182; Alexandru Gabor, “Christian Democracy and 
Welfare”, European Journal of Science and Theology, vol. 8, no. Suppl. 1, 2012, pp. 313-320. 
35  Pavel Pšeja, “Sociální encykliky Jana Pavla II. a jejich politické aspekty”, in Petr Fiala, 
Jiří Hanuš, Jan Vybíral (eds.) Katolická sociální nauka a současná věda, CDK, Vyšehrad, 
Brno, Prague, 2004, p. 153. 
MARIÁN SEKERÁK 
 
 
Romanian Political Science Review ? vol. XV ? no. 1 ? 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
70
political ideology (and concurrently opposing the economic neoliberalism) 
those of Benedict XVI seem to be exemplary. In his encyclical Caritas in 
veritate of 2009 the Pope pleads for strengthening of the role of a state in 
economy and highlights that “the state’s role seems destined to grow, as it 
regains many of its competences”36. In the same document the Pope emphasizes 
that any economic activity should “be directed towards the pursuit of the 
common good, for which the political community in particular must also take 
responsibility”37. This statement is congruent with traditional conservative calls 
for strong political institutions and paternalism which is, however, ambivalent 
with economic neoliberalism. 
Some other affiliations with conservatism could be found in papal 
teaching on the issue of socialism. As I tried to point out earlier, 
neoconservatives unanimously reject any left economic programmes, including 
the social-democratic or socialist ones. In the same way, many popes 
throughout the history condemned socialist political ideology. Blessed Pius IX 
labelled socialism and communism (particularly because of their atheistic 
stance) as “the wicked theories” in the encyclical Nostis et Nobiscum38. In 
another encyclical Quanta cura (1864) he criticized both ideologies because of 
requesting to build the existence of the families and households solely on the 
principles of civil (i.e. not canon) law. “A plague of socialism” was considered 
to threaten the whole society, natural bound between a man and a woman and 
the divine law also by Leo XIII in many of his encyclicals (Quod apostolici 
muneris, 1878; Diuturnum, 1881; Humanum genus, 1884; Libertas, 1888; 
Graves de communi re, 1901). Similarly, the popes Benedict XV (Ad beatissimi 
apostolorum, 1914) and Pius XI (Quadragesimo anno, 1931) deemed socialism 
as incongruent with the Catholic teaching. Later in the early 1970s, Paul VI 
lamented in his apostolic letter Octogesima adveniens (1971) that Christians felt 
too often “attracted by socialism” and “tend to idealize it in terms which, apart 
from anything else, are very general: a will for justice, solidarity and equality. 
They refuse to recognize the limitations of the historical socialist movements, 
which remain conditioned by the ideologies from which they originated”39. St. 
John Paul II was another supporter of anti-socialist stance. His statements are 
congruent with his predecessor Leo XIII in accentuating the danger of viewing 
socialism as “simple and radical solution”40. 
At first sight, it might seem that the popes condemned any socially-
oriented economic programmes and, therefore, propagated capitalist economy 
                                                          
36
  Benedict XVI, “Caritas in veritate”, Acta Apostolicae Sedis, vol. 101, no. 8, 2009, § 41. 
37
  Ibidem, § 36, italics in original. 
38
  Pius IX, “Nostis et Nobiscum” (8 December 1864), § 6, http://www.papalenc 
yclicals.net/Pius09/ p9nostis.htm 
39  Paul VI, “Octogesima adveniens”, Acta Apostolicae Sedis, vol. 62, no. 6, 1971, § 31. 
40
  John Paul II, “Centesimus annus”, Acta Apostolicae Sedis, vol. 83, no. 10, 1991, § 12. 
Why Praying “Hail, Mary” Does Not Denote to Invade Iraq and to Accept Capitalism?  
 
Romanian Political Science Review ? vol. XV ? no. 1 ? 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
71
and pro-market measures. This is what many current scholars interpreting the 
Catholic Social Teaching try to promote in their works41. There are, however, a 
lot of papal statements and documents proving that the opposite is true. One of 
the clearest pronouncements is that of John Paul II made in his little known 
interview with Jas Gawronski, an Italian journalist and politician in 1993 for 
Italian daily La Stampa. Citing Leo XIII he claimed that some “seeds of truth” 
can be found even in a socialist political program42. Pope reminded that “in 
communism there has been a concern for the social issues, while capitalism is 
quite individualistic”43. Moreover, in one of his books then-cardinal Joseph 
Ratzinger and later Pope Benedict XVI admitted that “[i]n many respects, 
democratic socialism was and is close to Catholic Social Doctrine, and has in 
any case made a remarkable contribution to the formation of a social 
consciousness”44. 
Both popes elaborated similar thoughts in their social encyclicals. John 
Paul II wrote, for example, in his encyclical Laborem exercens of 1981 on the 
topic of human labour in terms of “exploitation of the workers” while 
confronting it with “the growing areas of poverty and even hunger”45. “The 
Church is firmly committed to this cause, for she considers it her mission, her 
service, a proof of her fidelity to Christ, so that she can truly be the ‘Church of 
the poor’”46. Thus, the social teaching of St. John Paul II went clearly closer 
“into a bit of a schizophrenic situation”47. On the one hand, the Pope rejected 
Marxism although this rejection went out of the anthropological understanding 
of a man. On the other hand, the issue of ownership and the associated 
problems, such as exploitation of workers and law wages can be found on the 
same platform as Marxism. However, some scholars insist, congruently with the 
                                                          
41
  See, e.g., Philip Booth, “Christianity, the Market Economy and the Limits to Human 
Knowledge”, Economic Affairs, vol. 25, no. 2, 2005, pp. 44-45; Idem, “Catholicism and 
Capitalism”, Economic Affairs, vol. 29, no. 3, 2009, pp. 63-67; Roman Míčka, 
“Církev a její potíže s liberalismem a kapitalismem”, Studia theologica, vol. 6, no. 4, 
2004, pp. 70-83; Idem, “Kdo vlastní klíče k interpretaci sociální nauky církve?”, 
Studia theologica, vol. 12, no. 2, 2010, pp. 86-101. 
42
  In the Italian original: “Ma è anche vero quello che dice Leone XIII, cioè che ci sono dei 
«semi di verità» anche nel programma socialista.” 
43
  John Paul II, “Intervista concessa da Giovanni Paolo II al giornalista Jas Gawronski e 
pubblicata dal quotidiano La Stampa”, (2 November 1993), http://www.vatican 
.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/1993/november/documents/hf_jpii_spe_19931102
_intervista_it.html. 
44
  Joseph Ratzinger, Without Roots: The West, Relativism, Christianity, Islam, Basic Books, 
New York, 2006, p. 72. 
45  John Paul II, “Laborem exercens”, Acta Apostolicae Sedis, vol. 73, no. 9, 1981, pp. 597–
598, § 8. 
46
  Ibidem. More about John Paul IIʼs views on the “preferential option for the poor” see 
Gerald S. Twomey, “Pope John Paul II and the 'Preferential Option for the Poor'”, Journal 
of Catholic Legal Studies, vol. 45, no. 2, 2006, pp. 321-368. 
47   Pavel Pšeja, “Sociální encykliky Jana Pavla II…cit.”, p. 147. 
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Pope, that neither Marxist account of history, nor its anthropology, are 
acceptable from the Christian point of view48. 
It needs to be added that a similar evaluation can be applied to the 
statements of his successor Benedict XVI. The Pope emeritus condemned 
Marxism as well as capitalism many times. In his address during the inaugural 
session of the Fifth general conference of the bishops of Latin America and the 
Caribbean in Aparecida on 13 May 2007 the Pope criticized both capitalist and 
Marxist economic systems for taking into account only material and economic 
dimension of the problems of humanity. He labelled this as “the most 
destructive error” of the systems. Both systems “falsify the notion of reality by 
detaching it from the foundational and decisive reality which is God”49. In the 
same speech the Pope used even sharper words in order to denounce both Marxist 
and capitalist economic scheme. It is worth quoting his statement at length: 
 
“Both capitalism and Marxism promised to point out the path for the creation of 
just structures, and they declared that these, once established, would function by 
themselves; they declared that not only would they have no need of any prior individual 
morality, but that they would promote a communal morality. And this ideological 
promise has been proved false. The facts have clearly demonstrated it. The Marxist 
system, where it found its way into government, not only left a sad heritage of economic 
and ecological destruction, but also a painful oppression of souls. And we can also see 
the same thing happening in the West, where the distance between rich and poor is 
growing constantly, and giving rise to a worrying degradation of personal dignity 
through drugs, alcohol and deceptive illusions of happiness”50. 
 
In a similar vein the Pope attacked “an unregulated financial 
capitalism” in his last Message for the celebration of the World Day of Peace in 
January 201351, and a “reckless capitalism with its worship of profit that results 
in crisis, inequality and poverty” which he did few days later in his address to 
the participants in the plenary meeting of the Pontifical council “Cor Unum”52. 
In the social encyclical Caritas in veritate the Pope described many of the 
current features of capitalism, such as mobility of capital and labour, 
outsourcing of human resources, or liberalization of the capital markets53. Pope 
emeritus also called for adoption of “new life-styles” in order to preserve 
                                                          
48  See John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, 2nd ed., 
Blackwell Publishing, Malden, MA; Oxford, UK; Carlton, Australia, 2006, pp. 177-205. 
49  Benedict XVI, “In inauguratione operum V Coetus Generalis Episcoporum Americae 
Latinae et regionis Caribicae”, Acta Apostolicae Sedis, vol. 99, no. 6, 2007, p. 449. 
50
  Ibidem, pp. 453-454. 
51  Benedict XVI, “Recurrente Universali XLVI Die precationi pro pace dicato. Beati gli 
operatori di pace”, Acta Apostolicae Sedis, vol. 105, no. 1, 2013, p. 63. 
52
  Benedict XVI, “Ad sessionem plenariam Pontificii Consilii  ‘Cor Unum'’, Acta 
Apostolicae Sedis, vol. 105, no. 2, 2013, p. 166. 
53  See Benedict XVI, “Caritas in veritate”, Acta Apostolicae Sedis, vol. 101, no. 8, 2009, § 40. 
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environment against harmful human influences54. This seems to be in contrast 
with the views of neoliberal economists like former Czech President Václav 
Klaus, one of the staunchest opponents of environmentalist movement55. 
Statements of Pope Francis’ post-synodal apostolic exhortation 
Evangelii gaudium (2013) are akin to those of his predecessors. The Bishop of 
Rome resolutely condemned “the absolute autonomy of markets and financial 
speculation”56. According to him, people “can no longer trust in the unseen 
forces and the invisible hand of the market”57. Francis has developed these 
positions in many of his other speeches, homilies and interviews. For reasons of 
space, however, I will not pay my attention to all of them. Nevertheless, a short 
comparison of the views of the three mentioned popes (St. John Paul II, 
Benedict XVI and Francis) could be helpful for us to thoroughly grasp their 
teachings on capitalism and unregulated market which differ substantially from 
the stances advocated by neoconservatives. 
Although the Pope John Paul II was strongly affected by the 
consequences of the year 1989 and preferred “healthy” capitalism, including 
responsible entrepreneurship to any mutation of planned economy, he was 
aware of the danger of separation of the economy from the ethical principles. 
This becomes a reality whenever the material well-being and profit are elevated 
above human dignity. His social doctrine was based on philosophical 
anthropology. According to this teaching a human being is a centre of 
economic life; therefore, it should not be treated as a production tool. In 
particular, in the encyclical Laborem exercens he has shown that ownership of 
the means of production and material goods should be perceived as means for 
human self-fulfilment. Likewise he criticized unrestrained pursuit of profit, 
consumerism and consumption slavery, which are typical of capitalist “society 
of abundance”. A lot of human needs are deeper in their origin and character 
and have a spiritual basis which cannot be fulfilled merely by market 
rationality. 
Also Benedict XVI has joined and developed socio-theoretical work of 
his predecessor. He accentuated the need for ethical framing of economy and 
pointed out to the global dimension of the problems that arise as a by-product 
of the utilitarian mentality. He also emphasized the need for universal human 
brotherhood, cooperation and solidarity of nations with poorer countries, as 
well as corporate social responsibility. 
                                                          
54
  Ibidem, § 51. 
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  See Václav Klaus, Blue Planet in Green Shackles. What Is Endangered: Climate or 
Freedom?, Washington: Competitive Enterprise Institute, 2007; James McCarthy, Scott 
Prudham, “Neoliberal Nature and the Nature of Neoliberalism”, Geoforum, vol. 35, no. 3, 
2004, pp. 275-283. 
56  Francis, “Evangelii gaudium”, Acta Apostolicae Sedis, vol. 105, no. 12, 2013, § 202. 
57  Ibidem, § 204. 
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It is clear that the distinctions in opinion vis-à-vis a laissez-faire market 
economy preferred by neoconservatives are increasingly becoming explicit in 
the works and speeches by Pope Francis, especially in his apostolic exhortation 
Evangelii gaudium. According to him the economic disparities between people 
and nations have been increasingly deepening and poverty is a reality that has 
not avoided people from the most developed countries. Non-payment of wages, 
degrading evaluation of the work and a high rate of unemployment become a 
reality in countries that have not significantly felt an impact of the economy 
based on belief in the “invisible hand of the market”. The hypothesis according 
to which the wealth of an individual helps to increase welfare of the whole 
society has proved to be wrong58. Speculative trading on virtual capital markets 
allowing a few people to maximize their personal gains is part of an ideology 
that overlooks the uniqueness of the human being and ignores suffering of those 
who did not enjoy the favour of “market happiness”. All views of the 
aforementioned three Popes sharply contrast with the ideas advocated by 
neoconservatism as a political ideology. 
Not only popes are those who strictly oppose the neoliberal, pro-market 
approach to economy. Similar statements as those made by St. John Paul II, 
Benedict XVI, or Francis can be found in the book of the contemporary 
German cardinal Reinhard Marx entitled Das Kapital: Ein Plädoyer für den 
Menschen (“Capital: A Plea for the Human Being”). Archbishop of Munich and 
Freising defends traditional economic system of many of the continental-
European states based on a welfare state. He is “firmly convinced that the 
welfare state is not only morally but also politically and economically 
necessary condition for the continued existence of a market economy”59. His 
diagnosis of laissez-faire capitalism (more market freedom, less governmental 
regulations) is identical with that of his namesake Karl Marx. Both prominent 
Germans see capitalism as a threat to society, blaming it for the increase of 
poverty, violation of the social peace, and loss of the moral and political 
freedom. Cardinal Marx, in contrast to the author of the “first” Das Capital, 
rejects the abolition of private property. He identifies the solution of the 
contemporary economic problems with state’s regulation of the economy. 
German prelate assumes that “the state is not a potential threat to freedom, but 
that freedom and market can be secured only by state’s authority”60. 
As radical as possible are the words of the official Vatican documents 
issued by the Pontifical council for Justice and Peace: The Note “Towards 
reforming the international financial and monetary systems in the context of 
global public authority” (2011) and “Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the 
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  Cf. Francis, “Evangelii gaudium”, cit., pp. 1042-1043, § 54. 
59
  Reinhard Marx, Kapitál. Plaidoyer pro člověka, Prague: Academia, 2013, p. 198. 
60
  Ibidem, p. 63. 
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Church” (originally published in 2004). The (anonymous) authors of the later, 
for example, remark the problem of exploitation and alienation of labour in 
capitalist economies in this way: 
 
“One must not fall into the error of thinking that the process of overcoming the 
dependence of work on material is of itself capable of overcoming alienation in the 
workplace or the alienation of labour. The reference here is not only to the many 
pockets of non-work, concealed work, child labour, underpaid work, exploitation of 
workers — all of which still persist today — but also to new, much more subtle forms 
of exploitation of new sources of work, to over-working, to work-as-career that often 
takes on more importance than other human and necessary aspects, to excessive 
demands of work that makes family life unstable and sometimes impossible, to a 
modular structure of work that entails the risk of serious repercussions on the unitary 
perception of one's own existence and the stability of family relationships. If people are 
alienated when means and ends are inverted, elements of alienation can also be found in 
the new contexts of work that is immaterial, light, qualitative more than quantitative”61. 
 
As I tried to show in this section, Catholic Social Teaching can hardly 
be identified with neoliberal approach to the economy preferred by many 
neoconservatives and (Catholic) paleoconservatives, not only those in U.S.A. 
On the one hand, a strong condemnation of Marxist and socialist political 
ideologies is present in various Catholic documents, especially in the papal 
encyclicals from the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century when 
Marxian theorists had been viewed as atheistic enemies of the Church, trying to 
destroy religious fundaments of society. After passing of several decades, 
however, the Church’s view has been gradually changing. This happens 
particularly in relation to the appearance of the ideas of liberation theology and 
Christian socialism. It is without any doubts that Pope Francis as the first Latin 
American head of the Church is under strong influence of the former. It should 
be remembered that many Christian Democratic parties in Europe, especially 
after World War II, have adopted and promoted the welfare state economy. On 
the other hand, the popes and the competent Vatican authorities have strongly 
condemned the dangers of capitalism and free market economy which causes 
widening of economic disparities and social exclusion. Therefore, 
neoconservative support of laissez-faire capitalism overtly contradicts the 
official Catholic Social Teaching. In this way, Catholic acceptance of 
libertarian economic ideas could be labelled as “heretic” as it was done by 
Daniel K. Finn62. It seems obvious, then, that Catholic Social Teaching should 
be viewed neither as “a political programme”, nor as “a coherent doctrine about 
society”; it is rooted in the tradition of Christian morality, Christian 
anthropology and philosophy, as well as “on the long-lasting experience with 
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the moral evaluation of social reality”63. Moreover, the Catholic doctrine “does 
not constitute a third path between liberal capitalism and Marxist collectivism. 
It is by no means a new ideology, but a moral-theological reflection on human 
existence in society”64. 
Described in this way, the Catholic Social Teaching “presents itself as a 
peculiar body of thought that not only should be associated with any political 
ideologies but which is, moreover, qualitatively different from them”65. When it 
comes to content, the Catholic doctrine should not and cannot be identified with 
ideology in political sense. For purposes of this article, I understand a political 
ideology as a body of ideas, opinions and theories that creates a social group 
about itself, about its position in society, about its objectives, which constitutes 
the program of political activities of that social group leading to the 
maintenance, modification or a complete change of socio-political order66. 
Catholic Social Teaching differs from both socialist (Marxist) and 
neoliberal (neoconservative, paleoconservative) political ideologies. It is 
critical and hostile towards almost all of the major rigid ideologies and concepts 
that are typical for modern age67. We must take into account that all papal and 
Vatican documents are addressed “to the largest possible number of people; this 
is the reason for the absence of unambiguous and decisive ideological 
opinions”68. Thus, neither Catholicism, nor Christianity as such should be 
defined in terms of political ideologies. The difference is twofold. First, 
political ideologies representing certain conceptions of good or ideal society are 
significantly connected with profane sphere. Christianity, on the contrary, is a 
religious system which does not consist of the body of conceptions of good or 
ideal society. It targets primary a transcendent dimension of man’s existence 
overlapping cognitively constructed reality. Second, political ideologies try to 
reach their aims by social actions. This feature, however, can be found hardly in 
Christianity. Every religion, of course, has a societal dimension, but 
Christianity, as well as Catholicism, does not request for social action in order 
to reach its aims which are transcendent. Thus, while political ideologies, such 
as neoconservatism or socialism require active social (and political) support, 
Christianity, in contrast, is immune to any social actions69. On the other hand, 
                                                          
63  Roman Míčka, “Kdo vlastní klíče k interpretaci sociální nauky církve?”, cit., p. 100. 
64
  Eugeniusz Górski, “Conservative-Liberal Socialism: The Socio-Economic Views of John 
Paul II”, Dialogue and Universalism, vol. 12, no. 6-7, 2002, p. 37. 
65
  Pavel Pšeja, “Sociální encykliky Jana Pavla II…cit.”, p. 152. 
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  Cf. Richard GEFFERT, “Ideológie a ich funkcie v politickom živote”, Politické vedy, vol. 10, 
no. 1-2, 2007, p. 39. 
67
  Pavel Pšeja, “Sociální encykliky Jana Pavla II…cit.”, p. 153; Eugeniusz Górski, 
“Conservative-Liberal Socialism...cit.”, p. 43. 
68  Eugeniusz Górski, “Conservative-Liberal Socialism...cit.”, pp. 42-43. 
69  Michal Šabatka, “Křesťanství ve světle teorie ideologie: analýza fenoménu moderní 
doby”, Politologická revue, vol. 15, no. 1, 2009, p. 74. 
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the Catholic Social Teaching is often interpreted by Neoconservatives as 
inclined to and supporting laissez-faire capitalism. It is for that reason why 
multiple references to the teaching are helpful in order to contradict such 
misinterpretations. 
 
 
Foreign Policy Doctrine of the American “Neocons”  
and the Catholic Church 
 
In this section, I would like to briefly introduce fundamental differences 
in perspectives on the issues of international politics between the Catholic 
Church (represented by the Holy See) on the one hand, and the (U.S.) 
Neoconservatives on the other. I intent to depict them on the background of the 
“two Wars in Gulf”: the Gulf War and the war against Iraq. I not aim here to 
present a detailed analysis of neither historical events, nor diplomatic actions 
taken by the Holy See as a part of her foreign policy at that time. My brief 
analysis will cover ideological rather than geo-political or diplomatic issues. 
Analysing both conflict situations, i.e. both wars directed against Saddam 
Hussein’s troops, the latter of which ultimately led to his overthrow and 
execution, it seems clear that the Holy See’s position had not been significantly 
different. An enduring feature of her diplomacy and foreign policy was 
emphasizing the need for peaceful dispute resolution stemming from the 
Catholic doctrine accentuating that “the promotion of peace in the world is an 
integral part of the Church’s mission”70. In addition to this, the Church holds 
that diplomacy must be “based on the firm and preserving conviction that peace 
can be won through quiet listening and dialogue”71. Preference of diplomatic 
instruments such as shuttle diplomacy provided by Pope’s personal envoys, and 
accentuating of the need to maintain world peace in view of the serious 
humanitarian and economic consequences of a war have been undoubtedly 
meaningful. From the perspective of the U.S. seems to be paradoxical that 
(especially taking into account the position of the Realist school of IR) in the 
war against Iraq had suffered by massive demonstration of its power. It is 
obvious that the restoration of American soft power could be one of the 
solutions of the situation. On the other hand, this aspect of U.S. foreign policy 
should not be overvalued especially when American unilateralism still persists. 
Thus, the United States “will never ask for permission to defend their own 
security: they will not hesitate to act unilaterally and pre-emptively. Although 
the States would seek for support of the international community, the right to 
                                                          
70  Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, cit., § 516. 
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  Francis, “Ad Publicas Auctoritates Coreae Meridionalis apud Aedes Praesidiales”, Acta 
Apostolicae Sedis, vol. 106, no. 9, 2014, p. 693. 
MARIÁN SEKERÁK 
 
 
Romanian Political Science Review ? vol. XV ? no. 1 ? 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
78
self-defense will still remain their vital interest in spite of being in conflict with 
other [international] treaties”72. 
Some analysts assume that U.S. foreign policy doctrine under Bush, 
Jr.’s presidency, based on spreading of the freedom and democracy with a 
privileged utilization of pre-emptive attack and humanitarian intervention 
means clear rejection of the post-World War II international consensus and 
adoption of the neoconservative imperial vision accompanied with the above 
mentioned unilateralism73. Such unilateralism, or unilateral militarism 
conducted under the aegis of “democracy promotion”74, however, can be hardly 
deemed as a way of fighting international terrorism, or dealing with issues such 
as “weapons of mass destruction” but “is rather the road to an Orwellian 
nightmare and era of perpetual war in which democracy and freedom will be in 
dire peril and the future of the human species will be in question”75. Other 
scholars admit that is possible to talk about certain neoconservative-based 
values of G.H.W. Bush’s foreign policy but it would be a mistake, on the other 
hand, to argue that his case was a “pure neoconservative” policy76. In any case, 
it is evident that a space for the neoconservative ideological concepts had been 
clearly opened thanks to Bush’s managerial style and because of continuing 
uncertainty about the means and intentions of Hussein’s (i)rational political 
calculations77. Finally, the third type of interpretation suggests that although the 
invasion of Iraq was a product of Bush’s neoconservative values and a vector of 
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the impact of his closest collaborators, it meant a definitive (?) end of 
neoconservative hegemony in the White House and the failure of the “New 
American Century” concept promoted by the representatives of this school of 
thought, such as D. Rumsfeld, P. Wolfowitz, N. Podhoretz, I.L. Libby, R. Perle, 
R.B. Cheney, J. Bush and others. This assumption can be simply repulsed in 
confrontation with the aforementioned militarism. It could be hardly imagined 
that U.S. will give up their unilateral actions in foreign policy. As we have seen, 
such unilateralism is closely intertwined with the American domestic doctrine 
which appears to be inherently neoconservative. It is sometimes believed that 
the neoconservative chapter in the US foreign policy should not be viewed 
definitely closed even under Barack Obama’s administration78. This is so, 
because neoconservatism, as Brian C. Rathbun reminds us, is marked “by a 
high degree of voluntarism, a belief that the United States can remake the 
international environment”79. 
It would be helpful to remember the views of Bush, Jr.’s predecessor 
Ronald Reagan who has become an icon in the gallery of prominent 
neoconservative politicians. Like Bush, Jr., he had promoted democracy 
spreading to other countries. In his foreign political steps, however, Reagan 
largely followed the line of democratic restoration in those states where such 
tradition had been historically existed and was only “interrupted” with the 
arrival of (real or supposed-to-be) communist governments. Drawing from the 
fact of Reagan’s tolerance for some authoritarian regimes and moderate 
absolute monarchies some scholars assume, that “Reagan was not a 
neoconservative and that he would probably not have been agreed with the 
neoconservative democracy promotion in the countries without such 
tradition”80. On the contrary, in terms of domestic politics, it is thought that 
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  See Alexandra Homolar-Reichmann, “The Moral Purpose of US Power: Neoconservatism 
in the Age of Obama”, Contemporary Politics, vol. 15, no. 2, 2009, pp. 179-196. 
79
  Brian C. Rathbun, “Does One Right Make a Realist? Conservatism, Neoconservatism, 
and Isolationism in the Foreign Policy Ideology of American Elites”, Political Science 
Quarterly, vol. 123, no. 2, 2008, p. 299. See also Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar 
Moment”, in Ann G. Serow, Everett C. Ladd (eds.) The Lanham Readings in the 
American Policy, W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., New York, 1997, pp. 619-628; 
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Stelzer (ed.) Neoconservatism, Atlantic Books, London, 2004, pp. 57-74; Aaron 
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Studies, vol. 17, no. 2, 2008, pp. 257-293; Petar Kurečić, “Geopolitičke i geostrateške 
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Review, vol. 47, no. 3, 2010, pp. 203-219; Jean-François Drolet, “A Liberalism Betrayed? 
American Neoconservatism and the Theory of International Relations”, Journal of 
Political Ideologies, vol. 15, no. 2, 2010, pp. 89-118; Ty Solomon, “Resonances of 
neoconservatism”, Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 48, no. 1, 2013, pp. 107-112. 
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  Lukáš Petřík, Fenomén konzervativní revoluce Margaret Thatcherové a Ronalda Reagana 
a její ideové základy. Unpublished rigorous thesis, Charles University in Prague, Faculty 
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MARIÁN SEKERÁK 
 
 
Romanian Political Science Review ? vol. XV ? no. 1 ? 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
80
since his presidency the period of popularity of the New Right had been 
occurred in the country; it was a conservative turn going hand in hand with 
strengthening of the Republican Party and its ideological alliances with various 
domestic religious movements81. An outlined perception of Reagan’s foreign 
policy steps appears to be more interesting in comparison with those of Bush, 
Jr. Both politicians affiliated to the protestant Christianity (Reagan as a 
Presbyterian, G.W. Bush as a Methodist) are usually considered as politicians 
who had relentlessly followed neoconservative ideological line in their foreign 
policy. However, with the passage of time we can notice an endeavour of some 
political theorist “to cleanse” them of the epithet “neoconservative”. In my 
opinion it is so due to a number of negative connotations of the term which 
have begun to join it during recent years. Such well-intended attempts seem to 
be vain when challenging classical neoconservative axioms, for example a 
notion of the national interest which is defined in the widest possible way as “a 
belief in American moral authority” over the world and “as the primary 
instrument for realizing international outcomes”82. It seems that both Reagan’s 
and G. H. W. Bush’s policies towards states which were supposed to threaten 
American sovereignty show a lot of similarities with the mentioned description 
of the national interest. 
The previous discussion on the interpretation of undisputed influence of 
neoconservative ideology on G.H.W. Bush’s foreign policy should be added 
some important notes. First and foremost, the intellectuals of the 
neoconservative camp usually identify themselves with Christianity, whether 
Evangelical or Catholic. Religious faith constitutes a substantial and even 
necessary element of conservative thought in general, although theism or belief 
in a personal God Almighty is not necessary. Religious faith is especially 
important for the neoconservatives because providing a value basis relying on 
the truth revealed by God. Moreover, Christian belief provides protection 
against any ideological absolutism: Left one or Right one83. By criticizing 
political liberalism as well as by reference to the (Christian) religious ideals, 
many neoconservatives have sought to identify automatically their worldview 
with the Catholic Church’s teaching. They publicly declare that a true Catholic 
must not support any other policies than neoconservative ones. It is evident 
from the fundamental opinion shift of Michael Novak, one of the leading 
American Catholic neoconservatives, from the radical Left in 1960s and early 
                                                          
81  Roman Míčka, Michael Novak a jeho projekt teologie demokratického kapitalismu. 
Dissertation thesis, University of South Bohemia, Faculty of Theology, České 
Budějovice, 2007, p. 26. 
82
  Brian C. Rathbun, “Does One Right Make a Realist?...cit.”, p. 273. 
83
  Daniela Ježovicová, “Objekty konzervatívnej analýzy”, in Michal Dobrík, Dagmar 
Hoscheková (eds.) Aktuálne problémy politiky. Zborník príspevkov z I. teoretického 
seminára doktorandov v Banskej Bystrici 28. septembra 2004, Faculty of Political 
Science and International Relations, Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Banská 
Bystrica, 2004, p. 13. 
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1970s to his public support for Reagan’s presidential candidacy in 1980. This 
ideological shift has been considered as “sobering up”, i.e. the adoption of “the 
only correct” Catholic worldview84. 
To consider the current neoconservative ideology as a monolith of 
opinions would be a serious methodological and interpretive mistake. 
Conservatives in the U.S.A. are broken into several directions while the 
neoconservatives consider themselves as “modernized conservatives” who 
promote expansive, interventionist and activist models of foreign policy 
associated with pro-Israel demeanour and global spreading of the western-type 
democracy. As it was mentioned earlier, American neoconservatism “is based 
on the superiority of American ideals and values”85. Military power is deemed 
as unique tool for promoting American superiority86. Catholic Social Teaching 
strictly opposes such an approach. A war of aggression is always considered 
“intrinsically immoral”87. In the case where such a war breaks out, “leaders of 
the State that has been attacked have the right and the duty to organize a 
defence even using the force of arms. To be licit, the use of force must 
correspond to certain strict conditions”88. In this cases the Church follows her 
traditional just war doctrine. Unfortunately, the concept is viewed by 
neoconservatives differently. They deem it rather as “a surgical procedure in 
which multiple technological superiority over the enemy allows his total defeat 
while minimizing own losses”89. Therefore, it could be hardly imaginable that 
the political views of American neoconservatives reflect pacifist Catholic Church’s 
doctrine on international conflicts and the proper way of their resolving. 
 
 
Some Changes of the Catholic Doctrine 
 
As I mentioned earlier, Catholicism is being identified with rigid 
traditionalism and conservatism. On the contrary, throughout the history we 
have been witnessed many larger or smaller changes of Catholic Church’s views 
on some key societal and political issues. Church’s (in)consistency of opinions 
is not so apparent as it might seem at first glance. Catholic doctrine’s turnover, 
often substantial, have been recorded more than once in history. And it seems to 
be evident that some other changes would not be excluded in future. 
 
 
                                                          
84  Roman Míčka, Michael Novak...cit. pp. 13-15. 
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  Brian C. Rathbun, “Does One Right Make a Realist?...cit.”,  p. 283. 
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  Ibidem, p. 284. 
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  Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, cit., § 500. 
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  Ibidem. 
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On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Freedom 
 
The question of freedom of conscience and its range have been widely 
discussed for several centuries and it is obvious that this debate has not stopped 
until today. Christian democratic political parties adapted as their agenda the so-
called “reservation in conscience”, for example, in the exercise of medical 
profession and especially in providing contraception or abortion. Paradoxically, 
the consensus on the issue can found by Christians with liberals who by the 
very nature of liberalism support the free choice of man and the freedom to 
choose her worldview and a way of life under condition that it does not threaten 
freedom and life of another human being. It does not seem to be strange that 
Saint John Paul II highly appreciated the value of the freedom of conscience. 
His various speeches and documents can help us as proofs. One of the most 
beautiful examples is his message on the value of the freedom of conscience 
and religious freedom which was addressed in November 1980 to those heads 
of states which had signed the Helsinki Final Act of The Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe in 1975. In his letter Pope explicitly states that 
“freedom of conscience and of religion […] is a primary and inalienable right of 
the human person”90. Such a statement seems to be in a sharp contrast with the 
previous Catholic teaching represented by Gregory XVIʼs encyclical letter 
Mirari vos of 1832. At that time the Holy Father flatly rejected the idea of the 
freedom of conscience and religion freedom. He thundered that the infamous 
source of religious indifference is the mistaken belief that “liberty of conscience 
must be maintained for everyone”91. Furthermore, the Pope strongly criticized 
the other “errors” of that time: “Experience shows, even from earliest times, 
that cities renowned for wealth, dominion, and glory perished as a result of this 
single evil, namely immoderate freedom of opinion, license of free speech, and 
desire for novelty”92. Certainly, Pope’s inordinate statements were written as a 
reaction to than situation in the Papal States but “it set tone for papal statements 
for much of the rest of the century”, as Paul E. Sigmund reminds us93. This is 
obvious in his successor’s encyclical letter Quanta cura of 1864, accompanied 
with infamous Syllabus errorum (The Syllabus of Errors). Citing St. Leo’s 
epistle, blessed Pius IX, who had been previously hailed as a Liberal Pope by 
many revolutionaries, described freedom of discussion as the “most injurious 
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  John Paul II, “Message of John Paul II on the Value and Content of Freedom of 
conscience and of Religion”; (1 September 1980), LʼOsservatore Romano: Weekly 
Edition in English, no. 3, 1981, § 5. 
91  Gregory XVI, “Mirari vos”, § 14 (15 August 1832), http://www.papalencyclicals. 
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Politics, vol. 49, no. 4, 1987, p. 536. 
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babbling”94. In the late of the 19th century another Pope, Leo XIII embarked to 
fight a new enemy of the Catholic Church: liberals. He attacked liberal opinions 
and views, including the right for the liberty of conscience in his encyclical 
Libertas where he wrote that liberals made “the State absolute and omnipotent”, 
and had audaciously claimed “that man should live altogether independently of 
God”95. In spite of accepting the idea of republicanism or acknowledging the 
secular origin of state sovereignty Leo, opposing to modern liberal ideas, 
remained doctrinaire and reactionary96. 
The mentioned words appear to be in contrast with later Catholic 
teaching, mainly with the documents of the Second Vatican Council. In the 
Declaration on Religious Freedom “Dignitatis humanæ” of 1965 Council 
Fathers state that a man “is not to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his 
conscience”97. Moreover, the authors of the Declaration hold that “the freedom 
of man is to be respected as far as possible and is not to be curtailed except 
when and insofar as necessary”98. It is no wonder that these radical changes in 
the Catholic doctrine have been widely appraised by many scholars, for 
example by the famous political philosopher John Rawls in his last seminal 
work The Law of Peoples99. St. John Paul II extended Council teaching on the 
issue in his encyclical Centesimus annus. In the document he applied for a need 
of full-scale recognizing man’s right to life according to his conscience “which 
is bound only to the truth, both natural and revealed”100. 
 
 
On the Most Appropriate Political Regime 
 
Knowledge of the History of Ideas may be helpful to grasp of what 
leading Catholic theologians and thinkers of the past thought about the ideal 
form of political regime. Perhaps the greatest authority amongst them, St. 
Thomas Aquinas, had proposed one of the most elaborated teachings on the 
topic. It is worthy to remember that the authority of “Doctor Angelicus” in the 
system of Catholic doctrine was enshrined by Pope Leo XIIIʼs encyclical letter 
Aeterni Patris (1879). Contrary to this fact it remains true that the rehabilitation 
of his philosophy and theology “implied no concessions to modern ideas; the 
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Tomistic model was helpful in expressing the Church’s opposition to modern 
political theory”101. 
Although Aquinas’ views on the most proper political regime differ in 
his various writings they can be reconstructed to some extent. On the one hand, 
in his notorious seminal work Summa Theologiæ, he pleads for a “well mixed” 
government as the best form of political regime102. But on the other hand, in an 
unfinished work On Kingship to the King of Cyprus (in Latin De Regno ad 
Regem Cypri) the famous Doctor of the Church claims that a peace which is the 
aim of the state is caused by the unity of the people drawing its legitimacy from 
one ruler not excluding a bad one. It is obvious that he advocates the rule of one 
man, but “not self-evidently nor on grounds of overriding principle”103. In the 
Summa Theologiae, however, he adds another spring of the peace, namely that 
the access to power is available to the greatest number of people. Therefore, 
some scholars interpret this contradiction in a way that “Summa Theologiae 
only extends the theory of the work ʻOn Kingship’”104. But anyway, according 
to Aquinas, such regimes as tyranny, oligarchy and democracy should be 
included into the group of “bad” or unjust governments. An adjective of “fair” 
should be attributed to politea, aristocracy and monarchy whilst the latter he 
considers as optimal for three reasons. In the mentioned work On Kingship 
Aquinas explicitly states that “[g]overnment by one is [...] more advantageous 
than government by several”105. An explication of his stance is threefold. First, 
government by one or monarchy is efficient and it is serves as the best tool for 
providing general interest, the so-called common good. Second, the monarchy 
has the least tendency to degenerate into tyranny. Third, the monarchy as a 
governance of a king over his realm is analogous to God’s rule over the 
world106. On the other hand, Aquinas admits that people living in the kingdom 
could get the impression that their contribution to the common good will not 
benefit them but, on the contrary, it will be beneficial only to the king. This may 
turn into peoples’ indifference to the common affairs107. 
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The same Pope, who put Aquinas on the top of the hierarchy of Catholic 
theologians of all times, admitted that it is not for the Church to decide which 
political system is optimal. In the 7th chapter of his encyclical Diuturnum of 
1881 Leo XIII wrote that when justice is being respected people should not be 
prevented from choosing a form of government which they consider to be the 
best. Similar views he expressed eleven years later in his encyclical Au milieu 
des sollicitudes focused on the relationship of the Church and the State in then 
France. Pope assumed that any political regime is good only if leading to the 
ultimate goal which is the common good (bonum communae). He repeated his 
teaching in the encyclical Sapientiae christianae claiming that the Church 
“holds that it is not her province to decide which is the best amongst many 
diverse forms of government and the civil institutions”108. As in many other 
issues, the Second Vatican Council marked a substantial turn also in Church’s 
doctrine on the most proper government. In the Pastoral Constitution on the Church 
in the Modern World “Gaudium et spes” we can find following statement: 
 
“It is in full conformity with human nature that there should be juridico-political 
structures providing all citizens in an ever better fashion and without any discrimination 
the practical possibility of freely and actively taking part in the establishment of the 
juridical foundations of the political community and in the direction of public affairs, in 
fixing the terms of reference of the various public bodies and in the election of political 
leaders. All citizens, therefore, should be mindful of the right and also the duty to use 
their free vote to further the common good”109. 
 
Although still working with the concept of “common good”, Church 
gave a new content to her teaching on the right form of government by 
supporting a universal suffrage. She declared by the mouths of the Council 
Fathers her full support to citizens’ self-governance, namely democracy. Her 
preference for democracy as the most suitable form of government has 
definitely reached the Catholic Social Teaching after the “Annus mirabilis” 
1989. Apparently the bigger appraisal of the democratic form of government is 
John Paul II’s statement in the Centesimus annus. Looking at the changes that 
had occurred in the Central and Eastern Europe he wrote that  
 
“the Church values the democratic system inasmuch as it ensures the participation of 
citizens in making political choices, guarantees to the governed the possibility both of 
electing and holding accountable those who govern them, and of replacing them 
through peaceful means when appropriate”110. 
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What is surely beyond dispute is that such papal statement had been 
unimaginable at the times of St. Thomas Aquinas or later, even at the beginning 
of 20th century111. 
 
 
Church’s Internal System and Competencies of Her 
Members 
 
Since Jorge Mario Bergoglio sit on St. Peter’s throne, it has been 
vigorously debated (not only outside the Catholic Church) on the need of 
fundamental reform of Church’s structures, especially the Roman curia. In his 
first major papal document, Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Gaudium which 
has been the subject of controversy among many neoconservatives112, the Pope 
explicitly calls for “a conversion of the papacy”113. He appeals the central 
structures of the Church and the institution of the papacy as such to obey the 
call for pastoral conversion. “Excessive centralization, rather than proving helpful, 
complicates the Church’s life and her missionary outreach”, writes the Pope114. 
While current Pope calls for “a sound decentralization”115, his 
predecessor before more than one century did not permit such a possibility. St. 
Pius X in his encyclical Pascendi Dominici gregis (1907) questioned the 
requirements of “modernists” who had claimed that “a share in ecclesiastical 
government should [...] be given to the lower ranks of the clergy, and even to 
the laity, and authority should be decentralised”116. In the list of “the errors of 
the modernists” called Lamentabili sane (1907) he denounced by his full 
doctrinal authority the modernistic claim that “the organic constitution of the 
Church is not immutable. Like human society, Christian society is subject to a 
perpetual evolution”117. In the encyclical Pascendi the Pope expressed his 
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wondering how modernists had been dare to ask to adjust the Index of the Holy 
Office (List of Prohibited Books) and the Roman congregations. Apart from the 
fact that infamous Index librorum prohibitorum was formally abolished in the 
late 1960s by blessed Paul VI we should label Pope Francis at least as a 
modernist if not a heretic, using the words of his predecessor. Indeed, for St. 
Pius X, as he wrote in Notre charge apostolique, the true friends of the Church 
and people were neither revolutionaries, nor innovators: they were 
“traditionalists”118. 
 
 
Some Other Changes in Church’s Teaching 
 
It seems to be evident from the previous examples that the Church 
could change her opinion over time and flexibly adapt her teaching on a number 
of key issues. It is salutary to note that many other changes have not yet been 
mentioned. What I bear in mind are following instances: changed Church’s 
position in learning about the position of the Earth as the centre of the Universe, 
an accessibility of the Holy Scripture to all believers and using of the historical-
critical exegetical method which was allowed by Pius XII by his encyclical 
Divino afflante Spiritu (1943), burning of heretics as those who expressed 
disagreement with the official teaching of the Church in medieval times, 
Church’s attitude to Darwin’s theory of evolution which has been, after its 
initial rejection, officially accepted as a scientific theory by Pius XII in his 
encyclical Humani generis (1950), the possibility of liturgical celebration in 
vernacular languages which was authorized by the Second Vatican Council in 
the Constitution Sacrosanctum Concilium (§§ 36 and 54). A few years back, 
however, the Pope Pius XII wrote to the bishops in his encyclical Mediator Dei 
(1947) that it had pained him grievously to listen about using “of the vernacular 
in the celebration of the august Eucharistic sacrifice”119. Moreover, the Bishop 
of Rome strictly protested against the translation of some feasts outside their 
normal day of celebration which is now common practice, for example, in case 
of the feast of Corpus Christi which was in some countries translated to the 
nearest Sunday. 
Furthermore, it is worthy to compare Church’s paste and present 
attitudes to the problem of the so-called animation of a human body. In 
accordance with Aquinas’ theological opinion the soul connects to body tens of 
days later after the act of conception while the number of souls varies 
depending on the sex of the fetus. More precisely, the man encompasses his/her 
soul from the act of conception but firstly he/she acquires just a vegetative soul. 
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Consequently, a vegetative soul is replaced by a sensitive one and, later, rational 
soul replaces a sensitive one. A few centuries later the Church through the 
instruction Donum vitae (1987) issued by the Congregation for the Doctrine of 
the Faith thought about the “animation” that human being from the very 
moment of its conception is immediately endowed with a soul. It was confirmed 
by St. John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium vitae of 1995 (§§ 60 and 61). 
These and many other circumstances affecting man’s life have 
underwent a thorough re-consideration and confirm that the Catholic Church 
today could not be viewed as (too) conservative institution as it might appears 
at first glance. Therefore, it is not appropriate to exclude completely any 
possibility that some other issues in which Church takes a strict approach today 
will not be revised in a foreseeable future. Some signs have already been 
evident as a shift in the question of Eucharistic communion of divorced 
Catholics who have entered into a new civil marriage. Church’s doctrinal 
position on homosexual persons also remains a great challenge. In spite of 
referring homosexuality as a “grave depravity” and homosexual intercourse as 
“intrinsically disordered and contrary to natural law”120, the Church at the same 
time warns against unjust discrimination towards homosexual persons121. Such a 
quite friendly approach of the Church was completely unimaginable few 
decades ago. On the contrary, only “thanks” to several sentences in the 
Catechism a vast number of people are forbade loving and they are 
recommended to live “in chastity”, i.e. to choose involuntarily exactly the same 
state of life which has been chosen voluntarily by the priests and friars. It is 
possible that this unpleasant situation of many Catholics might one day become 
an impetus for the revision of the Church’s view to this topic. As it has been 
proven many times before, the Church herself is always capable of internal 
reforms. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
What are we to conclude, then, from our debate of the relation of the 
Catholicism and Neoconservatism? The Catholic Church is undoubtedly a long-
lasting and honourable institution with a significant moral and political impact. 
It consists of a varied group of people with different ethnic and social origin. 
Even more importantly, the political views of her members are not homogenous. 
It is said that only the Holy Spirit knows the exact number of Church’s religious 
                                                          
120  Catechism of the Catholic Church with Modifications from the Editio Typica, Doubleday, 
New York, 2003, § 2537. 
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orders. The same is true, apparently, when we talk about political and 
ideological orientation of the Catholics. 
It has been proven in the paper that the Church should not be viewed as 
a monolith of unchangeable opinions. It means that its own views concerning 
various issues have been evolving over times. Take, for example, an issue of the 
freedom of conscience and religion, or ideal type of government. Church’s own 
views on divorced Catholics and homosexuals have been slowly changing as 
well. In all these cases it has been shown that the Church is capable of self-
reflection and can change its own doctrine face to face of the global societal 
progress. This is one of the main reasons why it would not be considered a 
conservative institution. Moreover, the Church has very different views than the 
neoconservatives, many of whom consider themselves as “orthodox Catholics”. 
It is well evident in her views on the economy or foreign policy. These are 
fundamentally different from those held by neoconservatives. While the Church 
fence against both capitalism and socialism and the statements of recent Popes 
are closer to the social-democratic or Keynesian economic views, 
neoconservatives prefer a neoliberal approach of the free market and minimal 
governmental intrusions. In its foreign policy doctrine, the Church gives priority 
to peace, international institutions, international law and diplomatic way of the 
conflict resolution. Neoconservatives, on the contrary, prefer power solutions, 
pre-emptive attacks, militarism and unilateralism. Any diplomatic negotiations 
are considered by them as a sign of weakness. Therefore, we can hardly identify 
individual opinions of neoconservative believers with the views of the Catholic 
Church. Accordingly, the Church does not identify itself with any political 
ideology. In addition, neither Catholicism, nor Christianity as such is political 
ideology, as it has been shown. It is worthy to note that Christianity as such is a 
religion and differs significantly from neoconservatism which does not address 
theological issues at all, despite occasional using of special “priestly rhetoric”. 
At the end of the paper it should be reminded that Church’s doctrine 
forbids any fundamentalist interconnections of the Catholicism with a political 
ideology. It was long-reigning Leo XIII who wrote in his encyclical Sapientiae 
christianae that the Church “resolutely refuses, promoted alike by right and by 
duty, to link herself to any mere party and to subject herself to the fleeting 
exigencies of politics”122. In like manner, the Pope refused any attempts “to 
involve the Church in party strife”123. More than century later the Church 
reiterated this teaching in other words: 
 
“It is difficult for the concerns of the Christian faith to be adequately met in one 
sole political entity; to claim that one party or political coalition responds completely to 
the demands of faith or of Christian life would give rise to dangerous errors. Christians 
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cannot find one party that fully corresponds to the ethical demands arising from faith 
and from membership in the Church. Their adherence to a political alliance will never 
be ideological but always critical”124. 
 
Some years ago Max Boot concluded in his chapter concerning the 
“myths of neoconservatism” that the representatives of this school of thought 
have not been relatively influential because of their connections with then 
ruling elites but “because of the strength of their arguments”125. A critique could 
say, on the contrary, that their voice is so strength and influential because it is 
too loud. In other words, neoconservatives shout loudly enough to be heard by 
politicians all over the world. Nevertheless, irrespective of the high frequency 
or plausibility and credibility of their arguments, Catholics’ voice aspires to be 
taken seriously in world politics. That voice, however, cannot be deemed 
congruent with any political ideology, including the neoconservative one. In this 
paper I have tried to prove that some of the “myths of neoconservatism” are not 
in fact myths, but true grounded principles of this political theory. 
Neoconservatives’ preference of unilateralism in international politics, 
reduction of the importance of international political institutions or support of 
laissez-faire capitalism have proved to be inconsistent with Catholic Church’s 
teaching. For that reason, we cannot deem neoconservatism a political theory 
that would publicly act as “spokesman” of Catholicism or Christianity as a 
religion, despite occasional (pseudo)religious rhetoric used by the proponents of 
the theory. 
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